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Currently, online organizational resources and assets are potential targets of several types of attack, the most common being
ﬂooding attacks. We consider the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) as the most dangerous type of ﬂooding attack that could
target those resources. The DDoS attack consumes network available resources such as bandwidth, processing power, and
memory, thereby limiting or withholding accessibility to users. The Flash Crowd (FC) is quite similar to the DDoS attack whereby
many legitimate users concurrently access a particular service, the number of which results in the denial of service. Researchers
have proposed many diﬀerent models to eliminate the risk of DDoS attacks, but only few eﬀorts have been made to diﬀerentiate it
from FC ﬂooding as FC ﬂooding also causes the denial of service and usually misleads the detection of the DDoS attacks. In this
paper, an adaptive agent-based model, known as an Adaptive Protection of Flooding Attacks (APFA) model, is proposed to
protect the Network Application Layer (NAL) against DDoS ﬂooding attacks and FC ﬂooding traﬃcs. The APFA model, with the
aid of an adaptive analyst agent, distinguishes between DDoS and FC abnormal traﬃcs. It then separates DDoS botnet from
Demons and Zombies to apply suitable attack handling methodology. There are three parameters on which the agent relies,
normal traﬃc intensity, traﬃc attack behavior, and IP address history log, to decide on the operation of two traﬃc ﬁlters. We test
and evaluate the APFA model via a simulation system using CIDDS as a standard dataset. The model successfully adapts to the
simulated attack scenarios’ changes and determines 303,024 request conditions for the tested 135,583 IP addresses. It achieves an
accuracy of 0.9964, a precision of 0.9962, and a sensitivity of 0.9996, and outperforms three tested similar models. In addition, the
APFA model contributes to identifying and handling the actual trigger of DDoS attack and diﬀerentiates it from FC ﬂooding,
which is rarely implemented in one model.

1. Introduction
A Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) is the most
common type of ﬂooding attack, which ﬂoods computer
networks. Complex network environments consist of a

variety of servers, including web, Internet of Things (IoT),
cloud, fog, etc., that are exposed to huge requests that slow
down networks and interrupt services [1]. These attacks
occur for diﬀerent reasons such as ﬁnancial, personal, political, ransom, and cyberwar at diﬀerent security levels and
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cause various attack impacts [2]. Accordingly, DDoS attacks
aﬀected nearly 2,500 organizations with 75,000 computer
systems and over 100 countries with four million computers
in 2010 and 2011 [3]. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2016, a 602 Gbps
DDoS attack was launched against the BBC website and
crashed the website for several hours [4]. Basically, before
the attack, the attackers (known as Demons) hack personal
computer users who access the web and take over these
computers. Subsequently, attackers exploit these computers
by planting harmful codes or other strategies to gain control
of the computers [5]. The number of these hacked computers
(known as Zombies) can reach into thousands. Such a
number of Zombies’ creates a “botnet,” which is a network of
private computers that has been planted with malicious
software and manipulated as a group without the owners’
knowledge, e.g., to send spam. The severity of attacks depends on the size and scale of a botnet. A bigger botnet is
usually associated with increasingly severe and catastrophic
attacks.
There are two main types of DDoS attacks. The ﬁrst type
targets the Network Application Layer (NAL) such as HTTP
ﬂood, DNS ﬂood, and FTP [6, 7]. In this type, the attacker
issues vindictive or noxious bundles/packets aimed at the
unfortunate casualty to cause disarray concerning the
convention or any application that keeps running on it (e.g.,
vulnerability or defencelessness attack) [5]. The second type
targets the Network and Transport layers such as UDP ﬂood,
TCP ﬂood, and ICMP ﬂood [8]. In all of these attacks, the
attacker targets to (i) exhaust system assets, transfer speed,
or the handling limit of switching to upset the network of an
authentic client and (ii) exhaust the servers’ assets such as
memory, CPU, I/O, transmission capacity, and HDD/database transmission capacity to interfere with the administrations of legitimate clients. This study focuses on attacks
targeting the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) of the
NAL.
A kind of abnormal network traﬃc is the Flash Crowd
(FC) that causes a refusal of administration for an Internet
administration’s real clients [9]. The FC closely resembles
the DDoS attack, whereby enormous legitimate clients simultaneously access a speciﬁc processing asset (e.g., a
website). For instance, important news created worldwide,
the distribution of the Olympic timetable, or organizations
like Apple, Sony, and Samsung initiating a novel item brings
about an unexpected ﬂood in authentic traﬃc [10]. These
outcomes of the ill-timed and undue conveyance of reactions
by the web administration require prompt action. As DDoS
attacks and FC traﬃc contrast in only a couple of metrics,
distinguishing them is a major hurdle [11]. Researchers have
suggested and actualized various cybersecurity models to
defend network systems and applications from DDoS and
FC attacks. However, the harmful streams disguised in
authentic traﬃc are a scourge for these security prototypes.
Many of these models cannot distinguish between real and
pernicious streams with respect to negatives generations and
false-positives.
An agent is a programming component or an integration
of programming and equipment entities that can be executed in parallel in its clients’ interest. It includes numerous

Security and Communication Networks
helpful functions, such as learning capability, cooperation,
responsiveness, and eﬀectiveness [3]. The agent is deployed
in this area either in the attacker or defense teams [12, 13].
For instance, in Kotenko et al. [14], an agent or agents are
employed with an assailant system to produce and control a
vast number of deceitful DDoS botnet traﬃc. The agent is
used to oversee or handle versatile decision-making forms in
the protection against DDoS attacks. The enormous hurdle
in creating and strengthening the defense components of
DDoS is to distinguish between the DDoS attack and an FC,
in which a real action may oftentimes show up as malevolent. Cybersecurity research that focuses on distinguishing
between DDoS and FC attacks has progressed over the years.
Various artiﬁcial intelligence methods, such as fuzzy logic,
genetic algorithm, K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) calculation,
Bayesian networks, neural networks, software agent technology, and Support Vector Machines (SVM), are discussed
in the literature.
We are inspired to design an agent-based defense model
that has the ability to protect against DDoS and FC targeting
the NAL. We consolidate the agent with the protective or
defensive archetype. We assume that it is important to
develop an eﬀective method that detects DDoS attacks and
expunge malicious traﬃcs at the application layer level
before they cause harm to the web servers and applications.
We propose an Adaptive Protection of Flooding Attacks
(APFA) model to protect the NAL against DDoS and FC.
Four modules form the APFA model: (i) Abnormal Traﬃc
Detection Module (ATDM), (ii) DDoS Attack Detection
Module (DADM), (iii) Adaptive Traﬃc Control Module
(ATCM), and (iv) Kalman and Bloom Filters Module
(KBFM). The ATCM represents our main contribution,
which integrates an adaptive agent with the belief-desireintention (BDI) architecture to identify, classify, and control
traﬃcs of network systems. The test results of the APFA
model show that the adaptive agent does not just give an
upper hand by enhancing procedure value or capacity but
coordinates the process of the innovative modules and
improves the overall performance of the simulated network
system.
We organize this paper into six sections having the ﬁrst
section as an introduction to the research work. In Section 2,
we review the related work. Section 3 presents the research
methods and materials. Section 4 illustrates the main
components of the APFA model. Section 4 describes the
simulation environment and testing platforms. In Section 6,
we discuss the results and review the contributions and
limitations of this work. Finally, Section 7 presents the
conclusion and highlights a key point for future work.

2. Related Work
Several well-established studies have focused on the defense
against DDoS attacks and control FC traﬃcs that targeted
the NAL. In this section, we review the details of the most
eﬀective and related well-established works that have been
presented and discussed in the literature.
Shiaeles et al. [15] accomplished a DDoS attack recognition with enhanced time constraints using a
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nonasymptotic fuzzy evaluator. The evaluator is implemented on average packet inter-arrival durations. The
complication is divided into two units: recognition of the
actual DDoS attack and identiﬁcation of the IP addresses of
the victims. The former task is accomplished by employing
stringent, real-time boundaries for DDoS attack discovery.
The latter goal is achieved using comparatively lenient
constraints, which identify the IP addresses of the victims
promptly, thereby starting embedded anti-attack functions
on the aﬀected hosts employing the arriving time of the
packet as the primary statistic of DDoS attack detection.
Kaur et al. [16] use the “survival of the ﬁttest” principle in
which when many clients try to get scarce assets; the stronger
clients overcome the weaker ones. Consequently, to replace
clients with low ﬁtness, a chain of repetitions or successive
approximations is implemented using a ﬁtness or suitability
function. In this instance, GAs could be used with information captured from inbound streams of packets and in
selecting optimum metrics to detect and distinguish attacks
from normal packets. Katkar et al. [17] recommend using a
network intrusion detection system model that uses signatures to identify DDoS attacks on HTTP servers by using
shared handling and a naive Bayesian classiﬁer. They use
observational outcomes to validate the eﬃciency of the
model. The naive Bayes classiﬁes attacks that are slow and
have 97.82% precision, and regular behavior is detected with
a precision of 96.46%.
Barrionuevo et al. [18] propose an approach and an
analysis of its practicability on three known attacks of service
denial: Fraggle, Land, and Smurf. They solve the execution
problem using the HPC techniques in the GPU to quicken
the procedure and produce the outcomes. They evaluate the
approach via several indices. The proposed approach achieves 40% to 70% accuracy and 60% to 83% sensitivity. The
F-measure, which is employed to estimate the framework’s
execution, is 0.5 to 0.83. Sreeram and Vuppala [19] propose a
Bio-Inspired Anomaly-based application layer DDoS attack
(App-DDOS Attack) to defend against DDoS attack by using
the CIDDS dataset. Furthermore, the proposed model aims
to achieve fast and early detection. As shown in the results,
the proposed model achieves an excellent result in defending
against DDoS attacks with 99.64% accuracy. However, the
proposed model lacks the ability to deal with the legitimate
traﬃcs that stream with pernicious DDoS traﬃcs, but it has
the ability to detect only limited types of ﬂooding attacks.
A multilevel DDoS mitigation framework (MLDMF) is
recommended for all levels of the IoT systems architecture
[20] that is built upon the edge-, fog-, and cloud-computing
levels. IoT gateways are utilized at the edge-computing level
to manage and secure IoT nodes based on the SDN. An IoT
management control unit (IMCU) is employed at the fogcomputing level, which consists of SDN controllers and
software to detect and neutralize DDoS attacks. On the other
hand, the cloud-computing level analyzes the network
traﬃcs using big data and AI to protect against DDoS attacks
by establishing an intelligent attack identiﬁcation and
mitigation structure. The simulation outcomes of the three
computing level architecture of the IoT show that the edgecomputing level’s quick response capability, fog-computing
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level’s state recognition feature, cloud-computing level’s
computing capability, and SDN’s network programmability
could solve the DDoS problem in IoT.
Verma and Ranga [21] present the measurable examination of the marked stream-dependent CIDDS dataset
utilizing K-NN grouping and K-Means bundling calculation. Some noticeable assessment parameters are utilized to
assess IDS, including accuracy, recognition rate, and falsepositive rate. In another work of Verma and Ranga [22], they
lead an itemized investigation of the CIDDS dataset and
report the discoveries. They utilize a wide scope of familiar
AI procedures to examine the multifaceted nature of the
dataset. The assessment measurements that they use include
recognition rate, precision, false-positive rate, kappa insights, and root mean squared deviation to appraise
implemented AI approaches.
Mohamed et al. [23] come up with an identiﬁcation
framework of HTTP DDoS attacks in a Cloud domain that
depends on Information-Theoretic Entropy and Random
Forest collection learning calculation. They utilize a timesensitive sliding window calculation to appraise the measure
of randomness of the network header attributes of the
approaching system traﬃc. At the point when the evaluated
entropy surpasses its typical range, the preprocessing and the
characterization exercises are activated. To evaluate the
suggested methodology, they carry out diﬀerent tests on the
CIDDS-001 open dataset. The recommended methodology
accomplishes acceptable outcomes with a precision of
99.54% and FPR of 0.46%. Moreover, the framework has
been proposed to protect the cloud environment against
DDoS attacks. However, the proposed framework is inefﬁcient in handling FC, and it can only detect limited types of
ﬂooding attacks.
An agent-based methodology and programming condition (which is based on the OMNeT++ INET framework)
is designed by Kotenko et al. [24] to model shared protection
techniques for installation on the web to neutralize network
attacks. This method is characterized by various agent
groups that collaborate to neutralize malicious traﬃcs and as
a protection mechanism against attacks. Similarly, Juneja
et al. [25] suggest a multi-agent architecture to identify,
protect, and track the origin of a DDoS attack. While this
approach is able to locate the source of a DDoS attack, a
number of agents are needed to produce the best results.
Kesavamoorthy and Soundar [26] develop a technique,
which uses a self-contained multi-agent system for detecting
and protecting against DDoS attacks. In this technique,
agents use particle swarm enhancement/optimization to
attain an excellent correspondence or interaction. DDoS
attacks are recognized when many connected agents are
deployed to communicate new attacks to the coordinator
agent. The cloud-based system protects against many types
of DDoS attacks with an accuracy of 98%. A multi-agent-based
distribution system identiﬁes and prevents DDoS attacks
within the ISP boundaries and is presented in the work of
Singh et al. [27]. The agents and their coordinating partners
implement the task of preventing the attacks in all ISPs.
These agents work together by checking the incoming
traﬃcs on the edge router and using an entropy threshold-
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based technique to detect the existence of DDoS attacks. If
an attack occurs, the coordinator agent communicates this
information with the neighboring ISPs to create a distributed protection environment. The authors adopt certain
metrics to assess the performance of the defense system.
However, the system’s eﬃciency is evaluated against the
system’s performance in the absence of suitable metrics.
Lin et al. [28] suggest two versatile sampling calculations
to gather security-associated information using agent technology. The agent has adaptive mechanisms to enhance acquisition productivity, guarantee to gather precision, and
reduce the measure of gathered information. The aim of these
mechanisms is to limit the impact of information capturing on
the regular activities of a network. The outcomes demonstrate
the beneﬁts of the versatile security-associated information
gatherer with respect to the productivity and ﬂexibility of
adaptive agents.
Generally, we can ascribe a DDoS attack as a scalable
network security issue. While researchers have developed
many detection and defensive mechanisms against DDoS
attacks, success has been limited in implementing the
mechanisms across a range of computing networks. The use
of the artiﬁcial intelligence approach is limited to identifying
whether clients’ requests are valid or malicious based on the
requests’ attributes. However, the above discussions clearly
enlighten the software agent’s suitability as a technology that
could be used in our proposed model to make the system
more ﬂexible and adaptable in dealing with the various cases
of DDoS and FC targeting network traﬃcs.

3. Materials and Methods
This section discusses the research materials and methods of
this work, starting with a review of the adaptive agent architecture and mechanisms related to this work, followed by
a description of the CIDDS testing dataset and its attributes.
Subsequently, we explain the threats model design and the
evaluation methods.
3.1. Adaptive Agent. An agent is a mix of equipment or
programming elements that is responsive, for the beneﬁt of
its clients, in an autonomous manner. It has numerous
helpful attributes like adaptivity, autonomy, connectivity,
learning, reactivity, and proactivity. An adaptive agent
provides applicability in vast domains, for example, portable
processing, data recovery and processing, smart communication, media communications, and electronic commerce
[29]. These agents interact in a multi-agent framework and
are directed in diﬀerent manners to serve particular clients
or perform speciﬁc tasks. The qualities that spurred the
utilization of the agent technology in this work include its
self-governance, adaptation to failures, dynamic setup, autonomous decisions, situatedness, and scalability [25]. The
agent may now and again endeavor to adjust to be more
adept to its new or dynamic condition or to manage new or
evolving objectives [30]. Contemplations of agent alteration
or acclimatization incorporate what calculation can be
utilized to alter the agent behavior? What is the utmost
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measure of progress anticipated in the agent framework?
How is the framework going to stop development from
going beyond control? And how to recognize and manage an
alteration whose impact is not ideal? Versatile identiﬁcation
is the learning capacity to recognize any alteration in chance
markings or conﬁgurations in an environment or system to
be more adept to its condition [31]. Figure 1 demonstrates
the deployment of adaptive mechanisms in agents based on
the agent’s dynamics and the related system.
The motivation behind the adaptation behavior can be a
response to changes, evaluation of situations, or dealing with
uncertainty. Adaptive procedures can be time-diﬀering
when receptive or responsive to a disturbance with a continuous interior shift of the choice procedure through repeated choice, successive choice, or audited rules [29, 32].
The reactive or responsive adaptive type is considered the
most eﬀective in this domain because it portrays the limit of
the protection prototype (e.g., time) to respond against the
DDoS attack. For instance, Cheng et al. [33] propose a DDoS
attack recognition model that utilizes responsive adaptation
in an agent to recognize and control attack streams. The
agent utilizes the responsive adaptation to screen the conduct of approaching streams of information and afterward
control the traﬃc movement.
3.2. The Testing Dataset and Parameters. Coburg Intrusion
Detection Data Sets (CIDDS) is a marked stream-dependent
dataset [6, 34]. It is created essentially for the assessment of
IDS and IPS. The dataset comprises OpenStack and External
Servers traﬃcs. We ignore Attack ID and Attack Description’s features in this study because they just oﬀer extra
insights into the executed attacks without signiﬁcantly
contributing to the analysis. We collect about 153,026 occurrences from the outer servers and 172,839 occurrences
from the OpenStack Server information for examination.
The dataset classes’ occurrences are labeled or marked as
expected, assailant, unfortunate casualty, suspicious, and
obscure classes. Table 1 gives a representation of CIDDS
dataset features.
Basically, the CIDDS dataset is chosen because it is the
most recent dataset, produced in 2017; available online for
free; and can simulate real-time processing due to its duration attribute. It also has the attributes of both DDoS
attack and FC ﬂooding traﬃcs and the other existing datasets
such as KDD, DARPA, and CAIDA, which lack the above
attributes. Many methods have been used in defending
against DDoS and FC. Each one of them used speciﬁc parameters that are suitable for the simulated systems. Table 2
presents the used parameters in building the simulated study
of this work.
3.3. The Threats Model Design. This study is mostly involved
with three sorts of ﬂooding attacks or attacks, in which each
is more clandestine than the previous one. (i) The assailants
put forth countless HTTP solicitations to expand the
framework asset and make the framework useless for the
legitimate-client, which we refer to as the DDoS targeting
application layer [2]. (ii) The assailants assume responsibility
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Figure 1: The models of adaptive agent.
Table 1: The CIDDS dataset attributes [34].
No.
Feature name
Feature description
1
Src IP
IP address of the source node
2
Src port
Port of the source node
3
Dest IP
IP address of the destination node
4
Dest port
Port of the destination node
5
Proto
Protocol
6
Data are ﬁrst seen
Start time ﬂow is ﬁrst seen
7
Duration
Flow period
8
Bytes
Conveyed bytes
9
Packets
Conveyed packets
10
Flags
TCP ﬂags
11 Attack description Additional information about the attack
12
Attack type
Type of attack
13
Attack ID
Unique attack ID
14
Class
Category or label of the instance

with the machines; they are called “Zombies.” It is very
simple to accomplish and certainly diﬃcult to detect because
the irregular traﬃc is utilized into a gathering of targets and
behaves increasingly like an authentic visiting. (iii) A kind of
system traﬃc is FC that could initiate a stop of administration for an Internet administration’s legitimate-clients.
The FC is closely similar to the DDoS attack, in which a
speciﬁc ﬁgure of traﬃc requests legitimate service. For example, a site is accessed by a huge number of legitimateclients at the same time. Breaking news produced far and
wide, for example, the distribution of the Olympic calendar
or organizations like Apple, Samsung, and so on, launching
another product brings about an unexpected ﬂood in a
legitimate-increase in legitimate-traﬃcs [11]. All those types
of DDoS attacks are generated from the CIDDS dataset
because it has the required attributes and attack scenarios.

Table 2: The testing parameters.
No. Abbreviation
Parameters
Value
1
Window size The size of dataset segmentation
7
2
Period
The duration of the dataset
7
3
SSM
Special sequence matrix
130
4
MCP
Model-checking period
24
5
MST
Model similarity threshold
Dynamic
6
P0
Normal traﬃc intensity
—
7
P1
Current traﬃc intensity
—
8
P2
Traﬃc behavior
—
9
P3
IP history log
—

for some PC machines through the web, leaving these PCs in
a defenseless and helpless situation [5]. The assailants at that
point begin misusing the shortcomings of these PCs by
planting noxious codes or other hacking procedures to deal

3.4. Evaluation Metrics. In this analytical study, our system’s
performance is evaluated using eminent metrics, such as
accuracy, precision, and sensitivity. Those measurements are
assessed from the components of the confusion matrix.
True-Positive (TP), True-Negative (TN), False-Positive (FP),
and False-Negative (FN) are the components of a confusion
matrix, where TN is the number of actual nonoccurrences of
an attack. TP is the number of actual occurrences of an
attack. FP is the number of inaccurately identiﬁed attack
occurrences. Thus, FN is the number of inaccurately identiﬁed nonoccurrences as attack cases. Accuracy or exactness
is characterized as the proportion of all eﬀectively delegated
occurrences (TP, TN) to every one of the cases (TP, TN, FP,
and FN). Precision or preciseness (positive predictive
quality) is the proportion of TP to a sum of TP and FP.
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Sensitivity is the proportion of TP to a sum of TP and FN.
Accuracy is calculated using
TP + TN
.
Accuracy �
TP + FP + TN + FN

Requests
…

(1)

While precision is calculated using
TP
Precision �
.
TP + FP

…

(2)

ON/
OFF

(3)

No

DDoS
or FC

ATCM
…

This work proposes the Adaptive Protection of Flooding
Attacks (APFA) model, an engineered or structural expansion to protect web applications and servers against
DDoS and FC attacks. It is targeted at huge-scale online
organizations, including nonbusiness entryway websites.
The APFA consists of four accompanying units or modules:
Abnormal Traﬃc Detection Module (ATDM), DDoS Attack
Detection Module (DADM), Adaptive Traﬃc Control
Module (ATCM), and the Kalman Bloom Filters Module
(KBFM), as shown in Figure 2. The role of each module is
described in the following subsections. The base work of the
model is the AL-DDoS model, which is taken from [35, 36].
Therefore, some of the model’s basic parts are not detailed in
this paper.
4.1. The Abnormal Traﬃc Detection Module. The Abnormal
Traﬃc Detection Module (ATDM) is the ﬁrst part of the
APFA model. This module’s major aim is to monitor and
analyze the traﬃc to detect sudden changes in HTTP GET
requests. It does not take any action if no anomalies are
detected in the traﬃc. If it detects abnormal traﬃc from the
incoming HTTP traﬃc, an “attention” signal is sent to the
next module, which is the DADM, for further analyses, as
shown in Figure 2. Several steps are taken before sending an
attention signal starting with the measurement of the incoming traﬃc. This can be done in many diﬀerent ways, but
the APFA model measures traﬃc intensity by using an Auto
Regression (AR) mechanism [35]. In regression, previous
values aﬀect future values. Therefore, the AR mechanism
uses previously observed traﬃc to predict the change of
traﬃc intensity in the future. Initially, the HTTP GET traﬃc
stream is monitored. A time-series y1 , y2 , . . . , yt  is formed
by the traﬃc intensity, which is studied in constant time
intervals. The traﬃc intensity is calculated by the total
number of packages received in a time interval [36]. If major
changes are detected, it can potentially be a DDoS attack. The
AR predicts the current traﬃc intensity by using
p
k�1

…

ON

4. The Adaptive Protection of Flooding
Attacks Model

yt �  akt xt−k + et .

Attention
Dismiss

DADM
Parameters

TP
.
TP + FN

(4)

No

Yes

and, sensitivity is calculated using
Sensitivity �

Anomaly
traffic

ATDM

ON

ON/
OFF

Yes

KBFM

Buffer of IP
addresses

…
Web
services

Figure 2: The APFA model.

The variable yt predicts xt , which is the observed value
at time t. The variable akt is a “constant model parameter,”
which means that it remains constant with time, and et is the
observed error [36]. Secondly, at a certain time t, the difference between the observed xt and the predicted yt gives
the residual error xt [35].


(5)
dt � yt − xt .
From the residual error at time t, a standard deviation,
σ 2d , is calculated:
t

σ 2d

�

2

ti�t−p dt − avgdt−p  

(6)

p

Subsequently, a threshold is calculated as in equation (7),
which determines abnormal traﬃc. If dt is greater than kσ 2d ,
then, abnormal traﬃc is detected, and an attention signal is
sent to the DDoS attack detection module. Otherwise, no
abnormal traﬃc is detected, and the ATDM sends a “dismiss” signal to DADM, which inactivates itself, as shown in
Figure 2. The constant k adjusts the sensitivity of the
threshold and is set to a speciﬁc value.
dt > kσ 2d .

(7)

4.2. The DDOS Attack Detection Module. The DDOS Attack
Detection Module (DADM) is the second part of the APFA
model. It uses a trading strategy for dependably deciding a
packet’s source on the web. This strategy is well-known in
many DDoS protection models to distinguish the legitimate
origins of attacking packets existing in a network server [37]. It
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contains an adaptable stream-dependent labeling plan that uses
the attendant switch’s load to alter stamps or labels [24]. Based
on this strategy, the DADM uses Special Sequence Matrix
(SSM), which denotes zero as a normal request and one as an
anomaly request to give notable attributes for origin tracing the
IP bundles to furnish better tracing ability [19]. Appraisals of
embedded overload avoidance instruments enable this module
to provide an appropriate trace-back outcome, notwithstanding when there is a substantial burden on the server.
Aside from tracking DDoS attacking packets, DADM assists in
enhancing the ﬁltering or sifting of attacking traﬃc.
At the point when attention signals are sent from the
ATDM, the DADM starts tracing the source of each IP
address that sends the anomaly traﬃc. It then measures the
mean occurrences of the associated Real-time Frequency
Vector (RFV) of the traﬃc. The RFV holds the variation
range of daily traﬃc for a particular server. In enormous
traﬃcs, the mean occurrence of the RFVs can be seen as the
likelihood of every needed website page. Indeed, it is essential to ﬁnd the value of RFV for signiﬁcant traﬃc to
deliver the progress of traﬃc occurrences. For the traﬃc
model, M1 , we register RFVs possibilities:
p vi  �

|V|
i�1 Sij
|V|
|V|
i�1 Sij j�1 Sij

.

(8)

For a subsequent traﬃc model, M2 , we can determine
their support values using equation (9),
Pvi ⟶ vj |vi  �

Sij
.
|V|
i�1 Sij

(9)

The certainty of the M1 according to M2 is obtained
using equation (10). This indicates the likelihood of the
upcoming traﬃc models, M1 , M2 , . . . from vi ⟶ vj :
Pvi ⟶ vj  �

Sij
|V|
i�1 Sij

|V|
j�1 Sij

.

(10)

The DADM contrasts the present prototype and the
prototypes of typical traﬃc in the traﬃc model set if the
present model’s likelihood is more than an assumed
threshold. This unusual traﬃc is seen as a DDoS attack
model, or if the likelihood of the present prototype is lesser
than an assumed threshold, this irregular traﬃc is viewed as
a normal model [19]. In the training phase, the agent sets
some of its beliefs with thresholds. These thresholds are used
to reason and estimate the incoming traﬃc types between
normal, abnormal, FC. or DDoS. as explained in Section 4.3.
In addition, to distinguish the attack traﬃc from the typical
or normal traﬃc for every peculiarity or anomaly traﬃc, the
estimations of entropy on every model (M1 , M2 , . . .) are
determined to portray the appropriation of the approaching
origins and the targeted URLs. For the purpose of the investigation, S is the RFV of source IP addresses; T is the URLs
of needed website pages, numeral one as the “HTTP requests,” numeral two as the “normal.” According to the
meanings of each DDoS attacks and FC, the entropy En (S)
or En (T) is determined by equation (11):

En(S)2
En(S)1 En(S)1 En(S)4
>
>
>
.
En(T)2
En(S)1 En(S)3 En(S)4

(11)

Hypothetically, as appearing in equation (11), normal
traﬃc, for the most part, has the smallest proportion of
entropy quality and hence, diﬀerentiates the normal traﬃc
from the DDoS attacks. At this point, the traﬃc is not investigated to check for the possibility of FC.
4.3. The Adaptive Traﬃc Control Module. This work contributes an agent-based Adaptive Traﬃc Control Module
(ATCM), which has a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agent
architecture. With the BDI architecture, the adaptive agent
facilitates the task selection decisions based on mapping
desires with states of beliefs. These beliefs help the agent
make decisions on the course of actions required to complete
the tasks. The tasks involve monitoring the behavior of the
incoming traﬃcs data and controlling the ﬂow of the traﬃc.
The ATCM agent has a reactive component with which it
adapts the traﬃc through implementing three functions:
anomaly traﬃc identiﬁcation ati function, anomaly traﬃc
diagnosis atd function, and anomaly traﬃc handling ath
function. These functions process according to the values of
preexisting parameters or beliefs, including traﬃc attack
behavior, normal traﬃc intensity, and history log of IP
address. The belief constituents include information about
traﬃcs in the normal case as well as in the abnormal case.
Desires, also referred to as goals, are reﬂective of what the
agents intend to achieve. The agent can create desires or
goals explicitly or generate them during runtime. However,
in the ATCM agent, the desires are predetermined by the
corresponding tasks, which are explained in the following
paragraphs. Lastly, intentions are interwoven with plans,
which are sequences of actions structured toward achieving
the goals if there is a means of achieving them. The BDI
architecture of the ATCM agent reasoning cycle is as follows:
Step 1: observe the network traﬃc conditions and
update beliefs
Step 2: deliberate some defense desires to pursue based
on the updated beliefs
(i) Determine the available defense alternative desires
(ii) Filter out unrelated or unachievable desires
Step 3: generate intentions of carrying out tasks to
satisfy the selected desires
Step 4: execute actions to complete the corresponding
task
In addition, with these components of BDI, the agents
goals are diﬀerentiated from plans. There may be several
plans prepared for achieving a goal so that if one plan fails,
the agent considers other plans according to the reasoning
cycle. In a case wherein there are multiple plans to achieve
the goal, there is a cost-based selection function so that a less
time-consuming plan is selected. Figure 3 shows the architecture of the proposed ATCM and the related adaptive
functions.
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Figure 3: The architecture of the ATCM Agent.

Let the beliefs set, B, represent the network traﬃc parameters, which are: normal intensity, b0 ; traﬃc intensity, b1 ;
traﬃc behavior, b2 ; and IP history log, b3 . The agent’s beliefs
trigger the desires set, D, to react based on the traﬃc
conditions. Three functions: ati, atd, and ath, ﬁlter the
desires, D, and translate the D to intentions, I. The I include
the options of ﬁlters, i0; block, i1; and lock, i2 traﬃc actions.
They are deﬁned as follows:
(i) i0 temporarily ﬁlters the traﬃc signals by random
dropping of network requests. i0 is invoked when
FC is detected
(ii) i1 temporarily blocks the DDoS zombie network
requests. i1 is triggered when DDoS zombie IP
addresses are detected
(iii) i2 permanently locks the DDoS demon network
requests. i2 is invoked when DDoS demon IP addresses are detected
Based on Figure 3, when the anomaly traﬃc with the
source IP address reaches the agent of the DADM, the

ATCM agent controls the incoming traﬃc according to the
three predeﬁned intentions. In the ﬁrst step of an agent cycle,
the ati function checks the current traﬃc intensity with the
b1 . In case the current traﬃc intensity is more than b1 , it
means there is an attack traﬃc state. In case the current
traﬃc intensity is less than b1 , it means a normal traﬃc state,
and the traﬃc is allowed to pass to the web service. Subsequently, in the second step of the agent cycle, and after it
determines that the incoming traﬃc is a potential attack,
then the second function, which is the atd and based on b2
classiﬁes the type of traﬃc into DDoS or FC according to
equation (12).
n  xy −  x  y
���������������.
r � �����
2
2
2
n x −  x n  y2  −  y

(12)

At this point, any traﬃc that cannot be conﬁrmed to be
DDoS is labeled as FC. In the case of FC, the agent invokes
the execution of random Kalman ﬁlter, rkf function, i.e., in
the KBFM to block some of the traﬃc in a random manner
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temporarily. In the case of DDoS, the exclusive decision is
sent to the agent’s last function, which is ath for further
analysis. The ath based on b3 , separates the DDoS traﬃc into
Demons and Zombies. Then, the Demons’ IP addresses are
sent to the speciﬁc bloom ﬁlter for the sbf function to block
the Demons permanently. Finally, the Demons’ IP addresses
are saved in the buﬀer IP address for future processing.
Consequently, the Zombies’ IP addresses are sent to the
speciﬁc Kalman ﬁlter for the skf function to block the
Zombies temporarily. All the ﬁlter functions are described in
the KBFM.
4.4. Kalman and Bloom Filter Module. The Kalman and
Bloom Filter Module (KBFM) comprise Kalman and Bloom
ﬁlters. These ﬁlters are sequentially associated with network
traﬃcs. In the following segments, we clarify the signiﬁcance
and utilization of these ﬁlters.
4.4.1. Kalman Filter. The Kalman ﬁlter includes expressions
that permit assessing the procedure state via productive and
recursive computation such that the average of the squared
error is limited [38]. In our suggested prototype, the Kalman
ﬁlter is controlled by the agent. The agent sends signals to the
Kalman ﬁlter for actuation or shut-oﬀ depending on the
prearranged metrics and measure of approaching traﬃcs by
invoking one of the two functions. The ﬁrst function is the
random Kalman ﬁlter, rkf, function that performs impermanent blocks to random IP addresses. The second function
is the speciﬁc Kalman ﬁlter, skf, function that performs
impermanent blocks to the Zombies’ IP addresses.
4.4.2. Bloom Filter. In 1970, Burton Howard Bloom created
a ﬁlter named after him, called the Bloom ﬁlter, which can be
described as a probabilistic data structure that is spaceeﬃcient. This ﬁlter can be utilized to test and decide whether
a component is a member of a set. There is a plausibility of
false-positive matches but not false-negatives. Eventually, a
query can return as just “certainly not in set” or “potentially
in set” in which components can be included to the set but
not expelled when all things are considered as continuous
events. The likelihood of false-positives becomes bigger
when the number of components in the set increases [39]. In
our suggested prototype, the bloom ﬁlter is controlled by the
agent. It signals the bloom ﬁlter for initiation or shut-oﬀ
depending on the predetermined metrics and measure of
approaching traﬃcs by invoking speciﬁc bloom ﬁlter, sbf
function. This function performs permanent locking of the
Demons’ IP addresses.

5. Simulation Environment
This segment discusses the implementation of the simulator,
the tests performed, and the execution measurements that
are utilized in evaluating the APFA model. The simulator
includes implementing the AL-DDoS model of Zhou et al.
[36] as a base model. It also includes attack visualization and
analysis modules to monitor the performance of the attack
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traﬃcs and the protection models. The simulation illustrates
the impact of the DDoS and FC on the application layer with
and without the AL-DDoS and APFA models.
5.1. Simulator Description. We build the simulation process
design based on the attributes of the CIDDS dataset, and the
AL-DDoS and APFA models. We use the CIDDS dataset to
generate a large number of HTTP requests, including
normal and abnormal HTTP requests. We divide the dataset
into four weeks and model it with predetermined settings,
which we describe in the following section. We design the
APFA model in an almost similar design to the AL-DDoS
model, except that we add the ATCM agent and some related
changes.
Figure 4 shows the complete simulator design, which
starts with a connection of the dataset to the simulator and
dividing the data into training and testing sets. Traﬃc data
from the training set is fed to the ATDM to determine the
simulator thresholds by monitoring and analyzing the incoming traﬃcs during the training phase (Steps 1–4 as
shown by the ellipses). These thresholds are also received by
other modules and the ATCM to form the agent’s initial
beliefs. In the subsequent testing phase, the ATDM distinguishes between the normal and the abnormal traﬃc, and
passes the attention or dismiss the signal to the DADM. If an
attention signal is received, the DADM traces the source of
IP addresses that send the anomaly traﬃcs (Step 5). Consequently, it sends these IP addresses in the form of SSMs to
the ATCM agent for further analysis. While this study
contributes the ATCM agent as discussed in the previous
section, the BDI architecture of the ATCM agent controls
the execution of three plans (Step 6) [40].
These plans identify traﬃc conditions (Step 6.1), classify
the traﬃc type (Step 6.2), and control the traﬃc ﬂow (Step
6.3). These could be selected sequentially or arbitrarily based
on the traﬃc conditions and changes in the agent’s beliefs.
Finally, the ﬁltering operation that satisﬁes the analysis of the
traﬃc conditions is invoked (Step 7). Figure 5 shows the
sequence of the interactions between the four modules of the
APFA model of the simulator.
In this diagram, the rectangles show the modules, and
the squares represent the procedures of each module,
whereas the arrows show the direction of processing and the
interaction in a time frame as follows:
(i) User: exports the CIDDS dataset through a GUI
(ii) ATDM: monitors and analyzes the incoming traﬃcs
to set thresholds
o sends attention signal to the DADM in the case
of abnormal traﬃcs
o sends dismiss signal to the DADM in the case of
normal traﬃcs
(iii) DADM: traces traﬃc sources in the case of abnormal traﬃc based on the received signal
o Attention: traces the source of abnormal traﬃcs
and saves the IP addresses
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o Dismiss: stops the tracing process
(iv) ATCM: controls traﬃc ﬂow in the case of abnormal
traﬃcs by invoking
o ati: identiﬁes traﬃc conditions
o atd: classiﬁes the traﬃc type
o ath: controls the traﬃc ﬂow
(v) KBFM: ﬁlters traﬃc ﬂow in the case of abnormal
traﬃcs by invoking
o rkf: temporarily ﬁlters the traﬃc according to
random IP addresses and speciﬁc thresholds
o skf: temporarily ﬁlters the traﬃc according to
speciﬁc IP addresses and speciﬁc thresholds
o sbf: permanently ﬁlters the traﬃc according to
speciﬁc IP addresses and speciﬁc thresholds
(vi) Results: displays the information of the data analysis, processing cycles, and the simulation results
through a GUI.
We speciﬁcally develop the simulator for this work by
using C#, which is available on Visual Studio 2013 and
Windows 7. For the implementation and testing of the
simulator, the hardware used includes a 2.40 GHz Intel (R)
Core (TM) i7-5500U processor and 16 GB RAM.
5.2. Dataset Setting. The original Coburg Intrusion Detection Data Sets (CIDDS) is a ﬂow-based benchmark data
segmented into ﬁve diﬀerent groups of traﬃcs, which are
(normal, suspicious, unknown, attacker, and victim). The
CIDDS dataset is used in the simulation to generate a large
number of HTTP requests which include normal and abnormal HTTP requests. We neglect the Attack ID and
Description features because they just give extra information
about executed attacks [6]. This dataset was also used in
similar recent studies, and the settings of the dataset in our
work follow the work of Sreeram and Vuppala [19] and
Mohamed et al. [23]. Figure 6 shows the CIDDS dataset
network environment.
The performance of the IDS and IPS against ﬂooding
types of attack is speciﬁcally evaluated using the CIDDS
dataset. Figure 7 shows the segmentation of the original
dataset into four weeks and seven days. The week 1 folder
contains 9,412 IP addresses and sends 172,838 requests; the
week 2 folder consists of 8,357 IP addresses and sends
159,373 requests. The week 3 folder holds 2,605 IP addresses
and sends 70,533 requests, and the week 4 folder contains
15,369 IP addresses and sends 303,024 requests. We compile
these weeks in a ﬁle and reorganize the data instances accordingly. We then segment the CIDDS dataset into 60%
training and 40% testing sets, as shown in Figure 7. Hence,
the training and testing ratio of the CIDDS dataset is segmented according to the related work for which the comparison is made with them.
5.3. Simulation Setting. The advantages of using the CIDDS
dataset in this study are that it is current and customizable.
The simulation program is written with the C# programming
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language in a virtual environment to regenerate customized
datasets that are used in this work. However, the original
CIDDS dataset does not include FC labels. Subsequently, we
set the ground truth of DDoS and FC traﬃcs to train for the
thresholds and methods in the simulation based on the actual
data of the CIDDS dataset and statistical analysis of the data
using equations (4) and (5). The analysis of the training phase
results shows the average frequency of incoming requests. The
high request frequency signiﬁes the possibility of DDoS or FC
traﬃc. Moreover, any traﬃc that cannot be conﬁrmed to be
DDoS and have DDoS characteristics are labeled as FC.
Figure 8 shows an example of the statistical analysis, which
identiﬁes an average frequency of 37000 requests from the
clock time of 4 : 20 to 19 : 20 on day 1 of week 1.
We set the simulation parameters during the training
phase for both AL-DDoS and APFA models. The training
set almost represents 60%, and the testing set represents the
other 40% of the original dataset. It includes the Support,
Conﬁdence, and Possibility results when the window parameter is set to be 130. Correspondingly, the support,
conﬁdence, and possibility represent the values of the up
triangle, diagonal, and down triangle.
We perform diﬀerent tests to choose an optimal value for
all the testing parameters. Figure 9 shows an example of the
CIDDS dataset that generates web traﬃc, with original derivations and 2-step Kalman calibration. The results show the
detection of noticeable deviation for the abnormal traﬃcs.
The default M traﬃc model here represents the traﬃcs of
the three weeks, and it has been calculated as discussed before.
Table 3 shows the support, conﬁdence, possibility, entropy,
and minimum and maximum values of the M model. The
system is implemented based on these parameters, in which
the period is set to 7, and the SSM is ﬁxed to be 130.
During the training phase, the agent architecture includes three cases, anomaly traﬃcs, DDoS traﬃcs, and FC
traﬃcs, along with the agent’s reaction setting for the three
cases. The conditions of the anomaly traﬃc are classiﬁed
based on the traﬃc behavior into irregular, t0 ; discrete, t2 ;
and continuous, t2 , as shown in Table 4. This classiﬁcation
helps to identify the traﬃc types during the testing phase.
Based on Table 4 and as described in Section 4.3, the ati
has the elementary objective of identifying whether the
incoming traﬃc is normal or abnormal. In a scenario where
7.6428 is a threshold value for traﬃc intensity according to
the ATDM analysis, the current incoming traﬃc value is
updated in b1 , then it is compared with b0 . If the b1 value is
lesser than that of b0 (i.e., 7.6428), then the case is recognized
as regular traﬃc. If the b1 ’ value is higher than b0 , then the
next stage of calling the atd is triggered to determine the
traﬃc condition. For FC traﬃc, with a traﬃc intensity of
7.6428, we follow the same steps as the ﬁrst case. Abnormal
traﬃcs are diagnosed by the atd according to b2 . In this
scenario, based on the correlation coeﬃcient, the traﬃc
behaves as a discrete ﬂow, b2 ⟶ t1 and atd: b2 ⟶ i0 . As a
result, the agent instructs the KBFM to invoke the rkf with
2745 capacity, temporarily ﬁltering out 2745 IP addresses.
When the volume of the DDoS traﬃcs, which are detected in
this stage, is 10838 IP addresses, each IP address sends a
random number of requests. This traﬃc model is sent to the
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ATCM agent to identify, classify, and control the traﬃc
according to the agent functions. When incoming traﬃc is
10838 and has a continuous ﬂow, b2 ⟶ t2 , then, the atd:
b2 ⟶ i1 ∧ i2 is considered as a DDoS attack. This case
implies invoking ath, which handles the Zombies, r1 and
Demons, and r2 requests, ath: r1 ⟶ i1 ∧ r2 ⟶ i2 . The
agent instructs the KBFM to invoke the skf in which ath:
r1 ⟶ skf and the sbf in which ath: r2 ⟶ sbf with the
corresponding SSM information, which temporarily locks
the r1 and permanently blocks the r2 .

6. Results and Discussion
The test results evaluate the performance of the APFA model.
Then, the performance of the model is compared with three
similar models of Sreeram and Vuppala [19], Mohamed et al.

[23], and Zhou et al. [36]. We perform two tests on the CIDDS
dataset to evaluate the APFA model in which the CIDDS
dataset generates normal and anomaly traﬃcs. We perform the
ﬁrst test for the AL-DDoS model, which only detects normal
and DDoS traﬃcs. We conduct the second test for the APFA
model, which detects normal, DDoS, and FC traﬃcs. The data
of week 4 (after the modiﬁcation, it becomes 40% of the dataset
as explained in Section 5.2) are used for testing the model. They
contain a discrete and random series of incoming requests,
including DDoS and FC targeting the NAL. Table 5 shows the
daily frequency of the incoming requests of week 4. The traﬃcs
of week 4 are divided into seven days, starting with traﬃc day 1
with 38,919 requests and ending with day 7 with 33,228 requests. We observe from the table that day 7 has visibly lower
requests than the daily average incoming requests, which are
43,289, and day 4 has visibly greater requests than the daily
average of incoming requests.
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Figure 9: A sample of web traﬃcs from original derivations and 2-step Kalman.
Table 3: Values of the M traﬃc model.
M

Support
0.0000

Conﬁdence
0.0021

Possibility
0.050

Entropy
7.6428

Min
0.00000

Max
244,557.99

Table 4: Agent parameters setting.
Traﬃc conditions
Anomaly
FC
DDoS

Traﬃc
13,583
2,745
10,838

Behavior
t0
t2
t2

Table 5: The average incoming requests in the testing phase.
Day
Frequency

Day 1
38,919

Day 2
47,328

Day 3
44,921

6.1. Results of the AL-DDoS Model. The performance of the
AL-DDoS base model is calculated according to the window
size, period, and SSM parameters for every execution of
external traﬃc data. The AL-DDoS model performance is
evaluated based on correctly classifying traﬃc instances into
normal, and DDoS attack traﬃcs only. The volume of attack
traﬃcs detected by the AL-DDoS model is 26,8496 requests
triggered by 13,583 IP addresses. Subsequently, the results
show that the AL-DDoS model detects DDoS attacks and
blocks the IP addresses with an accuracy of 99.13%, precision
of 99.14%, and sensitivity of 99.99%. However, the AL-DDoS
model lacks handling FC and Zombies traﬃcs and considers
all DDoS traﬃc as Demons.
6.2. Results of the APFA Model. The results of the APFA also
present information about the number of anomaly requests of

Day 4
56,991

Day 5
39,835

Day 6
41,802

Day 7
33,228

the same week 4 from the dataset. The data are ﬁrst passed
through the ati function in the identify traﬃc conditions
phase of the ATCM agent. The ati detects a total number of
34,528 requests as normal and 268,496 as abnormal according
to the traﬃc intensity parameters with a total cost of 15,369
cycles. Then, the attack requests are classiﬁed by the atd
function, in the classify traﬃc type phase, into 264,551 requests as DDoS and 3,945 requests as FC, with a total cost of
13,583 cycles. The ath function, in the control traﬃc ﬂow
phase, controls the traﬃc according to the DDoS types of
175,624 Demons and 88,927 Zombies, with a total cost of
10,838 cycles. Then, the KBFM implements the required
blocking and locking of the requests. Table 6 shows the input,
processing, and output of each function in the ATCM agent.
Figure 10 shows the classiﬁcation results of the daily attack
requests of week 4 by DDoS and FC. The average daily DDoS

14

Security and Communication Networks
Table 6: The results of the agent run cycle during week 4.

No.

Run phase

Cost

Input req.

Output
Normal

1

Identify normal/abnormal

15,369

303,024

IP
1,786

2

Classify DDoS/FC

13,583

268,496

IP
10,838

3

Control demons/zombies

10,838

264,551

Req.
34,528
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Figure 10: The daily traﬃcs of DDoS and FC.

requests are 37,793, which is almost 96% of the average daily
abnormal requests, while the average daily FC requests is 563,
which is almost 2% of the average daily abnormal requests.
Figure 11 shows the number of Demons and Zombies
requests by the DDoS traﬃc. The average daily requests of
Demons is 25,103, which is almost 66% of the DDoS requests, while the average daily requests of Zombies is 12,703,
which is almost 44% of the DDoS requests.
In general, the results show that the APFA model is able
to detect and distinguish the DDoS and FC traﬃcs. It then
recognizes Demon and Zombie requests of the DDoS traﬃc.
The phase that is responsible for identifying the possibility of
abnormal traﬃc achieves the results of 99.11% accuracy,
99.14% precision, and 99.99% sensitivity. The phase that is
responsible for classifying DDoS and FC traﬃcs achieves the
results of 99.92% accuracy, 99.85% precision, and 99.96%
sensitivity. The phase that is responsible for controlling
Demons and Zombies traﬃcs achieves the results of 99.91%
accuracy, 99.89% precision, and 99.93% sensitivity. Ultimately, the APFA model achieves an overall accuracy of
99.64%, precision of 99.62%, and sensitivity of 99.96%.
Table 7 shows the performance results of the APFA model.
Figure 12 shows the daily performance results of the
APFA model. As observed from the ﬁgure, the APFA
model’s performance improves day by day due to the system’s ability to progress its adaptive behavior with time.
6.3. Analysis and Discussion. In the deep view of the Internet
network, there are many components that participate in
making up the web application framework. The HTTP requests sent from web clients are processed by a web server
and forwarded to the application server based on many
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Figure 11: The daily traﬃcs of Demons and Zombies.

Table 7: The performance results of the APFA model.
Evaluation metrics
Run phase
Identify normal/
abnormal
Classify DDoS/FC
Control demons/
zombies
Overall results

Accuracy % Precision % Sensitivity %
99.11

99.14

99.99

99.92

99.85

99.96

99.91

99.89

99.93

99.64

99.62

99.96

conﬁguration parameters like URL path preﬁx. These requests are directed to one of the web applications hosted by
the application server. A DDoS attack is a malicious event
that targets web servers without the need for internal system
access. Consequently, the attack is not easily detected in its
early stage. The attack entails the involvement of a huge army
of Zombies to cause conceivable damage to the network.
Critical attacks include concentrating a huge number of
nodes as a single target to inﬂict devastating damage to users
and completely overwhelm the network. Another type of
ﬂooding traﬃcs, which is FC, is depicted as network traﬃc
that is quite similar to DDoS traﬃc, but it comes from valid
users when a huge number of them access a particular
website simultaneously.
The benchmarking works of Sreeram and Vuppala [19],
Mohamed et al. [23], and Zhou et al. [36] only deal with two
types of traﬃcs, which are normal traﬃc and attack traﬃc.
The AL-DDoS base model of Zhou et al. [25] only detects
anomaly traﬃc requests, determines the source of each IP
address, saves these IP addresses in a bloom ﬁlter, and locks
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Figure 13: The hierarchical traﬃc control of the APFA model.

Table 8: The performance comparison with the benchmark models.
Model
Sreeram and Vuppala [19]
Mohamed et al. [23]
Zhou et al. [36]
APFA model

Technique

Dataset

Bat algorithm
Random forest
Statistical
Adaptive agent and statistical

CIDDS
CIDDS
CIDDS
CIDDS

all the anomaly traﬃc requests. However, among those IP
addresses, there are many cases of FC and Zombies’ requests
that belong to legitimate users yet are conﬁned to permanent
lock. Subsequently, this work proposes an Adaptive Protection of Flooding Attacks (APFA) model that identiﬁes
abnormal traﬃc requests and then further classiﬁes the
abnormal traﬃc requests to DDoS and FC. It then further
classiﬁes the DDoS to Demons and Zombies and applies
control procedures to temporarily block FC and Zombies’ IP
addresses and permanently lock Demons IP addresses.
Figure 13 shows the hierarchy of the APFA model control to
the NAL against ﬂooding traﬃcs.
Researchers have proposed, developed, and implemented numerous techniques to safeguard the NAL against
DDoS and FC attacks. However, hidden malicious traﬃc
behind valid traﬃc and the FC continue to plague these
defense models. Many of these models are unable to

FC
—
—
✓
✓

DDoS
✓
✓
✓
✓

Traﬃc type
Zombies
—
—
—
✓

Demons
—
—
—
✓

Accuracy %
94.80
99.54
99.13
99.64

diﬀerentiate between valid and invalid malicious traﬃcs
positively. In this paper, we proposed the APFA model, the
performance of which is evaluated by comparing it with
three benchmark models. The three models are tested for
similar properties and in similar conditions, and there is no
bias to declare. The comparison results are summarized in
Table 8, which show that the APFA model outperforms the
other three models.
Eventually, defense methods are continuously evolving
to improve and protect networks and computer infrastructures. The APFA model, like any other model, represents another attempt to provide variable eﬀectiveness
against DDoS attacks and FC ﬂooding. Three sources of
limitations need to be highlighted according to the scope of
this work. Firstly, this work does not consider the processing
time in the evaluation in which the adaptation and decisionmaking capabilities of the agent might slow down the
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performance of the model compared with the other tested
models. Secondly, the model is only tested using the CIDDS
dataset, which could be another constraint on the evaluation.
Finally, the testing of the model does not cover the low-rate
cases of DDoS attacks that are diﬃcult to discover with
existing solutions. Nevertheless, such DDoS attacks have no
harmful impact on real-world network systems.
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